14 May 2018: Maria Polukarov Title: Strategic Voting and Candidacy Abstract: We analyse voting scenarios from a game-theoretic perspective, viewing strategic parties as players and examining possible stable outcomes of their interaction (e.g., equilibria). Specifically, we model strategic behaviours by voters and candidates as voting/candidacy games, and study the existence of stable game outcomes, as well as their reachability by natural iterative processes, such as best-response dynamics or its restricted variants. Convergence of such procedures is a highly desirable property of the game, since, from a system-wide perspective, it implies that a system has a deterministic stable state that can be reached by the agents without any centralised control and/or communication. Speaker: Dr. Maria Polukarov is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Informatics at King's College London, UK. Prior to that, she worked in the School of Electronics and Computer Science at the University of Southampton, UK. She received a Ph.D. degree in Operations Research from the Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, with a special focus on Algorithmic Game Theory and Computational Social Choice - recently developed areas at the border of Computer Science and Economics, that deal with computational issues arising in strategic scenarios with multiple participants, such as the Internet or Multi-Agent Systems. Most of her work in the last few years has focused on modelling/optimisation problems and algorithmic questions that arise in strategic contexts, such as design and computation of solutions for multi-agent competition, coalition formation and multi-agent agreements, collective decision making and resource allocation. May 14 2018 14.00 - 15.00 14 May 2018: Maria Polukarov Strategic Voting and Candidacy IF 4.31/4.33
14 May 2018: Maria Polukarov Title: Strategic Voting and Candidacy Abstract: We analyse voting scenarios from a game-theoretic perspective, viewing strategic parties as players and examining possible stable outcomes of their interaction (e.g., equilibria). Specifically, we model strategic behaviours by voters and candidates as voting/candidacy games, and study the existence of stable game outcomes, as well as their reachability by natural iterative processes, such as best-response dynamics or its restricted variants. Convergence of such procedures is a highly desirable property of the game, since, from a system-wide perspective, it implies that a system has a deterministic stable state that can be reached by the agents without any centralised control and/or communication. Speaker: Dr. Maria Polukarov is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Informatics at King's College London, UK. Prior to that, she worked in the School of Electronics and Computer Science at the University of Southampton, UK. She received a Ph.D. degree in Operations Research from the Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, with a special focus on Algorithmic Game Theory and Computational Social Choice - recently developed areas at the border of Computer Science and Economics, that deal with computational issues arising in strategic scenarios with multiple participants, such as the Internet or Multi-Agent Systems. Most of her work in the last few years has focused on modelling/optimisation problems and algorithmic questions that arise in strategic contexts, such as design and computation of solutions for multi-agent competition, coalition formation and multi-agent agreements, collective decision making and resource allocation. May 14 2018 14.00 - 15.00 14 May 2018: Maria Polukarov Strategic Voting and Candidacy IF 4.31/4.33
